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Abstract
In a single framework, I address the question of the informational basis for
evaluating social states. I particularly focus on information about individual
welfare, individual preferences and individual (moral) judgments, but the model
is also open to any other informational input deemed relevant, e.g. sources of
welfare and motivations behind preferences. In addition to proving some pos-
sibility and impossibility results, I discuss objections against using information
about only one aspect (e.g. using only preference information). These ob-
jections suggest a multi-aspect informational basis for aggregation. However,
the multi-aspect approach faces an impossibility result created by a lack of
inter-aspect comparability. The impossibility could be overcome by measuring
information on non-cardinal scales.
1 Introduction
Welfare economics studies ways to evaluate the goodness of social states. Two
central and largely controversial issues are: On what information should the
evaluation of social states depend? How should this evaluation (functionally)
depend on the information? This paper is concerned with the first question.
This question of the informational basis has so far mainly been debated infor-
mally or analysed philosophically. For instance, the interpretational diﬀerence
between aggregating people’s interests and aggregating people’s opinions is at
the heart of Sen (1970a) and fills the first lines in Roberts (1995). I will put
the question of informational input on a more formal basis, and address both
conceptual and technical aspects.
Much of the interest that the question of the informational basis is receiving
relates to the debate over welfarism, the position that all that is needed to rank
two social states is the information of each person’s welfare in each state (where
welfare is seen as a single real number, yet possibly aﬀected by various factors
such as happiness, freedom, health, etc.). To illustrate the welfarism debate, let
me recall a pleasant highlight of the Seventh International Meeting of the Soci-
ety for Social Choice and Welfare (Osaka, 2004). After Charles Blackorby had
finished his Arrow Lecture, the discussion begun, not surprisingly, with an in-
tervention of Amartya Sen, who challenged the welfarist position by contrasting
two social states, the first of which seemed intuitively better despite of giving
each person lower welfare. Specifically, the first society is one of harmony, free-
dom and happiness, giving each person welfare 100. The second society gives
everyone the even higher welfare of 101, but achieves this through arguably re-
pulsive means: people are connected to Robert Nozick’s "experience machine",
which gives them permanent pleasurable brain stimuli. Blackorby replied by
arguing that Sen’s story is inconsistent: if the second society is really repulsive,
this should be reflected in lower welfare levels; conversely, if people’s welfare in
the second society is really as high as 101, it would be "paternalistic" to rank
the first society higher.
Suppose the welfare levels specified by Sen are correct. Would it then really
be paternalist to consider the first society better? An answer, it seems, would
require more information: how much do people want each society (preference
information), and how socially good do people themselves judge each society to
be (judgment information)? In Sen’s story, like in the standard model of welfare
economics more generally, only individual welfare levels are explicitly quantified.
Other information, such as preference information, judgment information, and
source-of-welfare information, are not explicitly modelled. The approach of
this paper is to make explicit and quantify all information deemed relevant.
The problem of the potential meaninglessness or practical infeasibility of such
measurements is of course serious, but it can be accounted for by imposing
suitable invariance conditions on aggregation.
Specifically, I propose to consider a set of relevant issues (Sam’s welfare,
Ann’s source of welfare, Peter’s preference, Daniel’s freedom, whether Peter’s
preference meddles into Daniel’s freedom, the preservation of nature, etc.), and
to each issue a performance function that measures how well each state per-
forms on the issue. I will consider the aggregation problem of aggregating these
performance functions into a social betterness ordering. In this framework, I
will formulate and analyse diﬀerent informational restrictions: welfarism, pref-
erencism, and judgmentism, which require the ranking of two states to be given
solely by the performances on the issues of, respectively, people’s welfares, peo-
ple’s preferences, and people’s goodness judgments. These three informational
bases are fundamentally distinct from each other: someone can get welfare from
a state without wanting it (e.g. if her preferences are other-regarding), or want
a state without judging it is socially good (e.g. if her preferences are self-
interested), or get welfare from a state without judging it as good (e.g. if she is
the winner of a redistribution she considers unfair). I will argue that welfarism
faces a paternalism charge, that preferencism potentially favours selfish people,
and that the relevance of judgment information hinges on the interpretation
given to aggregation. I will prove a theorem similar to the welfarism theorem,
but for an arbitrary (sub)set of issues rather than for welfare issues. Given the
objections against "single-aspect" approaches such as welfarism, preferencism or
judgmentism, I will investigate the potential of a "multi-aspect" approach that
combines information of diﬀerent kinds. The main problem is that suﬃciently
diﬀerent aspects are arguably non-comparable. This will lead us to an impos-
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sibility result in the spirit to Arrow’s Theorem, and closely related to results
derived in diﬀerent contexts by Roberts (1995), Khmelnitskaya and Weymark
(2000), and List (2004). I will argue that the inter-aspect non-comparability
can usually not be overcome, as inter-aspect comparisons are not just diﬃcult
to implement but usually meaningless. So, the multi-aspect approach can (and
should) arguably be rescued by allowing forms of measurability other than car-
dinal measurability.
2 A general aggregation problem
We consider a set X of (social) states with |X| ≥ 3. On the basis of what in-
formation should X be ranked? Most current formal work in welfare economics
uses Sen’s (1970) model of social welfare functionals (SWFL), where the infor-
mation made explicit about states is restrained in two ways: it is information
only about individual welfare, and this individual welfare is seen as a single real
number. Other information that is implicit in the description of states may still
aﬀect social rankings, but such eﬀects are hard to study formally in the model.
Some departures from this model have been presented. This includes multi-
dimensional aggregation models, whose explicit information about each person
is a vector of real numbers: in Roberts (1995) this vector contains diﬀerent
opinions on the person’s welfare (Sam’s opinion, Mary’s opinion, ...), and in
List (2004) the vector contains diﬀerent welfare types (the person’s opulence,
life expectancy, ...). While the latter two models make welfare-information
more detailed, Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005) make a person’s non-
welfare-characteristics explicit, but eliminate their eﬀects by imposing condi-
tions on aggregation.
Unlike these departures, I will place no restriction on the sort of explicit
information. Specifically, I consider an arbitrary set K of issues, where 2 ≤
|K| < ∞. An issue could be anything about a state deemed relevant for its
evaluation: it may but need not relate to a person, and if it does it may but
need not relate to welfare. As many examples of issues will involve individuals,
let N be the set of persons of society, where 2 ≤ |N | <∞.
A performance function for an issue k ∈ K is a function Uk : X → R, which
measures how well each state performs on the issue k. For instance, an issue
k ∈ K could be:
- Peter’s pleasure, so that Uk(x) quantifies Peter’s pleasure in x;
- the moral acceptability of Peter’s pleasure, so that Uk(x) is low if in x
Peter derives his pleasure from torturing someone;
- Jane’s goodness judgment of the social state, so that Uk(x) is high if Jane
finds society x good;
- Peter’s freedom, so that Uk(x) measures how free Peter is in x;
- social stability, so that Uk(x) is low if there is a civil war in x;
- a value like freedom of speech or the preservation of nature, so that Uk(x)
3
measures the degree to which the value is respected in state x.
For later reference, I give some precise examples of sets of issues K.
(i) Standard welfare economics considers for each person i ∈ N the issue
"i’s welfare". We can define K = N by identifying issues with individuals.
(ii) In Roberts (1995), we can put K = {(i, d) : i ∈ N, d ∈ D}, where D is a
set of persons with opinions on welfare and (i, d) is the issue "i’s welfare in d’s
opinion".
(iii) In List (2004), K can be defined as in (ii), where D is a now set welfare
types (income, health, ...) and (i, d) is the issue "i’s welfare of type d".1
(iv) A case of non-person-specific issues is K = {S,H,E}, with the three
issues "social stability", "health". "equality".
(v) K might contain (among other issues) for each person i ∈ N the issues
Welfi ("i’s welfare"), Prefi ("i’s preference") and Judgi ("i’s judgment"), as
discussed in Section 3.
(vi) Addressing one of Sen’s concerns, K might contain (among other issues)
for each i ∈ N the issue SoWi of (the moral acceptability of) the i’s source of
welfare.
A profile is a family of performance functions U = (Uk)k∈K — one perfor-
mance function for each issue. It can be seen as a single function U : X → RK .2
An evaluation functional is a function F that assigns to each profile U from some
domain D of ("admissible") profiles a (social) betterness ordering ºU= F (U),
i.e. a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation on X,3 with strict and
indiﬀerence components denoted ÂU and ∼U , respectively.4 F reflects how the
evaluation of states depends on their performance on the issues in K.
Despite of the interpretational diﬀerence, a formal analogy between this
aggregation problem and the standard one can be obtained by identifying issues
with individuals and performance functions with individual welfare functions.
So the rich collection of welfare economical results can be re-interpreted as
results on the present aggregation problem.
The issues in K can often be naturally classified into sets of issues of similar
type, so-called "aspects". Formally, an aspect is simply a non-empty set of
issues A ⊆ K. Aspects and questions of inter-aspect comparability will play
an important role below. Examples of aspects are: in (i) the set A ⊆ N of
homeless persons, in (ii) A = {(i, d) : d ∈ D} (opinions on i’s welfare), in (iii)
A = {(i, d) : i ∈ N} (welfare of type d) , in (iv) A = {H} (the single-issue aspect
of health), in (v) A = {Welfi : i ∈ N} (welfare), and in (vi) A = {SoWi : i ∈ N}
(source of welfare).
1In (ii) and (iii), D is the set of dimensions of the respective multidimensional model.
2The Euclidean space RK is the set of families of real numbers (uk)k∈K (that is, formally,
of functions f : K → R).
3Reflexivity: for all x ∈ X, x ºU x; transitivity: for all x, y, z ∈ X, x ºU y&y ºU z ⇒
x ºU z; completeness: for all distinct x, y ∈ X, x ºU y or y ºU x. The completeness
requirement, though standard, might in fact be questionable.
4For all x, y ∈ X, x ÂU y :⇔ [x ºU y and not y ºU x], and x ∼U y :⇔ [x ºU y and
y ºU x].
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Any profile U = (Uk)k∈K induces for each aspectA ⊆ K a subprofile, denoted
by UA := (Uk)k∈A and interpretable as a function UA : X → RA.
Finally, I use the standard notation >>,≥, <<,≤ for vector inequalities.5
3 Welfare information, preference information,
judgment information
Henceforth, much of the discussion (but not the formal results) will fucus on
the case (v) above, in which K contains (at least) for each person i ∈ N the
issues
- Welfi, representing i’s welfare (in the state),
- Prefi, representing i’s preference (for the state), and
- Judgi, representing i’s judgment (of the state’s goodness).
I now briefly discuss the interpretation of these issues, whose performance
functions UWelfi, UPrefi and UJudgi I call i’s welfare function, i’s preference func-
tion, and i’s judgment function, respectively. Let x ∈ X be any state.
Welfare information. UWelfi(x) represents (the amount of) i’s welfare (or
interest) in state x, as given by some account of welfare. Depending on the
account, UWelfi(x) might, for instance, be a measure of i’s happiness or experi-
enced pleasure in x (as in traditional utilitarianism), or simply a measure of i’s
opulence in x, or a measure of the fulfilment of i’s basic needs (for nutrition,
health, education, ...), or a Rawlsian index of i’s primary goods in x. Under a
somewhat diﬀerent, freedom-type notion of a person’s interests/welfare, UWelfi
measures i’s opportunities of some kind; e.g. UWelfi could be some index of i’s ca-
pabilities in x. Under yet another account, which avoids any "external" welfare
standard, UWelfi(x) is i’s subjective assessment of her own well-being in x. For
discussions of diﬀerent welfare accounts, see for instance Griﬃn (1986), Mongin
and d’Aspremont (1998), Roemer (1996), Sen (1985) and Summer (1996).
Preference information. UPrefi(x) represents (the amount of) i’s prefer-
ence for x, i.e. the amount to which i "desires" or "wants" x. For instance,
a rich but altruistic person i might prefer a society x with redistribution to a
society y without redistribution (so UPrefi(x) > UPrefi(y)), although i’s welfare
is higher without redistribution (so UWelfi(x) < UWelfi(y)). Of our three no-
tions — welfare, preference and judgment — preference is the one closely related
to (hypothetical) choice behaviour: if person i prefers state x to state y (i.e.
UPrefi(x) > UPrefi(y)), then she would choose x over y if oﬀered this choice.
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5For any vectors u, v, say in RA, u >> v :⇔ uk > vk ∀k ∈ A, u ≥ v :⇔ uk ≥ vk ∀k ∈ A,
u << v :⇔ uk < vk ∀k ∈ A, and u ≤ v :⇔ uk ≤ vk ∀k ∈ A.
6But I would not like to follow the revealed preferences school in considering the choice
behaviour as providing the meaning of preferences: preferences explain choice, not vice versa.
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Under a quite particular account of welfare, the distinction between welfare
information and preference information vanishes by definition, i.e. UWelfi =
UPrefi. This account identifies a person’s welfare with the fulfilment of her
(actual) preference.7 While an identification of welfare with preference is often
implicitly performed in economics (sadly, I think), it is also frequently criticised,
for instance on the grounds of defining away the possibility of non-self-interested
preferences (which go against personal welfare); a seminal paper is Sen (1977b).8
Note that each of the welfare accounts listed earlier (happiness, primary
goods, ...) draws a clear distinction between welfare and preference, and hence
between the functions UWelfi and UPrefi. Also, current welfarism often distin-
guishes welfare from preference. For instance, Blackorby and Bossert (2004)
write: "Individuals [...] may have self-regarding preferences that accord with
their well-being [i.e. welfare], but we do not assume that they do. If they do,
the individual [welfare] functions are representations of their preferences." Sim-
ilarly, Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (2005) explain that "expressed pref-
erence may not always be consistent with individual well-being [i.e. welfare]",
because (among other things) preference need not follow personal interest while
welfare does so by definition.
Judgment information.9 UJudgi(x) represents the (amount of) social
goodness of state x in i’s judgment. Diﬀerent persons may indeed form dif-
ferent goodness judgments.
Much could (and partly will) be said about the status of judgment informa-
tion and its (ir)relevance for social betterness. Let me anticipate that, under
certain interpretations of aggregation, it would be a category mistake to al-
low people’s goodness judgments to aﬀect social goodness, because personal
judgments are evidence for, not determinants of, social goodness. In other
aggregation tasks, evidence for goodness is precisely the relevant type of infor-
mation, which may make judgment information particularly relevant. A more
systematic analysis is attempted in Section 8.
Person i’s judgment function UJudgi could be regarded as the result of i’s per-
sonal process of aggregating her own information into her goodness judgments.
This aggregation is "personal" in two respects. First, the informational input
is what i has access to and considers relevant — for instance welfare information
7This desire-fulfilment account is popular in modern utilitarianism. But in its pure form
it is generally rejected, and replaced by diﬀerent modified accounts: accounts in which the
fulfilment of only certain desires count as part of welfare (e.g. only informed desires, or only
morally acceptable desires, or only desires whose fulfilment is experienced by the person, or
only desires that are part of the person’s aims). These modified desire-fulfilment accounts of
welfare let the diﬀerence between UWelfi and UPrefi re-emerge.
8As one consequence, Sen’s distinction between sympathy and commitment would become
meaningless, because Sen’s "commitment" is an other-regarding preference without eﬀect on
personal welfare.
9A very diﬀerent notion of "judgment information" are judgments expressed in formal
logic; such logical judgments form the informational basis in the field of judgment aggregation
(e.g. List and Pettit 2002, Dietrich 2004).
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if i is a welfarist. Second, the functional dependence of i’s goodness judgments
on that information reflects i’s views — for instance, sum-maximisation is used
if i is a utilitarian..
Questions of measurability of and comparability between these three infor-
mation types are discussed in Section 9.
4 Are multiple issues per individual needed?
Before proceeding, let me briefly discuss an objection. Suppose K contains only
person-specific issues, e.g. K = {Welfi,SoWi : i ∈ N} orK = {Welfi,Prefi, Judgi :
i ∈ N}. Could we then not have condensed all information relating to the same
individual (e.g. her welfare and her source of welfare) into a single index,
and take these individual indices as starting points for aggregation? If K =
{Welfi; SoWi : i ∈ N}, this amounts to forming indices Vi := g(UWelfi , USoWi),
i ∈ N , and aggregating (Vi)i∈N instead of (Ui)i∈K , which would bring us back
to the standard approach.
First, note that it is a strong mathematical restriction to demand that social
rankings depend on the profile (Ui)i∈K only through individual indices, in a
similar way as it is a very special case that a function from R100 to R turns
out to be a function of an index of the first fifty and an index of the last fifty
arguments (granting that indices must satisfy mild regularity properties such
as continuity and non-decreasingness in each argument).
Nevertheless, imposing this mathematically special case would become justi-
fiable if a compelling normative argument exists. It appears to me that such an
argument would have to establish that what matters about a given individual
i ∈ N is really only a single feature, perhaps i’s "well-being", where this feature
happens to depend on various issues (in K). In the example above, i’s welfare
and i’s source of welfare would have no intrinsic value but only instrumental
value by contributing to some other, uniquely relevant, feature of i, perhaps i’s
"well-being". Then could indeed justify taking indices Vi := g(UWelfi , USoWi),
i ∈ N , as the basis of aggregation.
But what would be this uniquely relevant individual feature to which many
(possibly quite diﬀerent) individual features contribute? It can be argued
that concepts such as well-being, welfare and pleasure are inherently multi-
dimensional (e.g. Griﬃn 1986; Sen 1987 uses the term "constitutive plurality").
If this is true, it appears unclear why multiple individual features should matter
only through some individual index. The single-index approach would then only
have the pragmatic justification of a simplification. In fact, also the two-issue
case K = {Welfi; SoWi : i ∈ N} would most likely be a simplification, as UWelfi
and USoWi are probably themselves indices.
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5 Welfarism, preferencism, judgmentism
The position that two states should be ranked solely on the basis of the welfare
information about these states is usually called "welfarism". I call "prefer-
encism" and "judgmentism" the analogous positions with welfare information
replaced by preference information respectively judgment information. More
precisely, consider for any aspect A ⊆ K the following "A-ism" condition, re-
ferred to as
- welfarism if A is the welfare aspect AWelf := {Welfi : i ∈ N},
- preferencism if A is the preference aspect APref := {Prefi : i ∈ N},
- judgmentism if A is the judgment aspect AJudg := {Judgi : i ∈ N}.
Independence of non-A characteristics ("A-ism"). For any profiles
U,U∗ ∈ D and any states x, x∗, y, y∗ ∈ X, if UA(x) = U∗A(x∗) and UA(y) =
U∗A(y
∗) then x ºU y ⇔ x∗ ºU∗ y∗.
Informally, A-ism requires that the ranking of two states be fully determined
by the A-information about the two states. Two obvious examples of A-ist
evaluation functionals are given by
x ºU y ⇔
X
k∈A
Uk(x) ≥
X
k∈A
Uk(y), for all x, y ∈ X and U ∈ D; (1)
x ºU y ⇔ min
k∈A
Uk(x) ≥ min
k∈A
Uk(y), for all x, y ∈ X and U ∈ D. (2)
For instance, taking A = AWelf in (1) yields standard utilitarianism, and tak-
ing A = APref in (2) yields the preferencist rule that maximises the minimal
"wantedness" of states across society.
Important examples of preferencist aggregation can be obtained in economic
allocation problems, by letting X be the set of possible re-allocations of some
fixed initial endowment of goods across a group, and letting the re-allocation
happen through some trade mechanism under idealised market conditions. This
does not quite define an evaluation functional F, because the outcome is not
a ranking of all allocations in X but a set of best allocations (equilibrium al-
locations of some sort). But, abstracting from this diﬀerence, the outcome is
preferencist: it depends on people’s preferences only, since these are which de-
termine people’s decisions to sell or buy. In particular, welfare or judgment
information has no eﬀect on the allocation (except from indirect, hardly pre-
dictable, eﬀects through aﬀecting individual preferences). In fact, not only is
the allocation preferencist, but it actually uses only ordinal preference informa-
tion, i.e. only the preference orderings induced by the functions UPrefi, i ∈ N .
See for instance Roemer (1996) for discussion.
In search of an appealing A-ism, each of welfarism, preferencism and judg-
mentismmay appear plausible candidates. Indeed, why not determine the good-
ness of states from how well-oﬀ people are (welfarism)? Or from what people
want (preferencism)? Or from what people find socially good (judgmentism)?
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Clearly, the plausibility of each of these positions is damaged by their mutual
incompatibility: someone may be well-oﬀ in a state without wanting it, or want
a state without judging it as socially good, etc.
In general, the larger the set A is, the less problematic A-ism becomes
(and the weaker this condition becomes logically). For instance, two frequent
objections against welfarism (i.e. AWelf -ism), namely that people may not want
certain welfare respectively that welfare may come from repulsive sources, could
not be made against AWelf ∪ APref -ism respectively AWelf ∪ ASoW-ism, because
these more comprehensive A-isms take into account the neglected information.
A normative defense of any A-ism, e.g. of welfarism, preferencism or judg-
mentism, could be attempted by deriving A-ism from arguably more funda-
mental conditions, in pretty much the same way as welfarism is standardly
derived from the conditions of universal domain, independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives, and Pareto indiﬀerence — the famous welfarism theorem, proven in
diﬀerent versions, among others by d’Aspremont and Gevers 1977, Sen 1977c,
and Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson 2005. I now present a theorem, whose
part (a) is an "A-ism theorem" analogous to the welfarism theorem, and whose
part (b) deduces an A-unanimity principle analogous to the weak Pareto prin-
ciple from a very plausible global unanimity condition.
In part (a) of the theorem, A-ism is derived from the following conditions.
Universal domain. D is the set of all profiles U : RK → R.
A-Indiﬀerence respectance. For all profiles U ∈ D and all states x, y ∈
X, if UA(x) = UA(y) then x ∼U y.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all states x, y ∈ X and all
profiles U,U∗ ∈ D, if U(x) = U∗(x) and U(y) = U∗(y) then x ºU y ⇔ x ºU∗ y.
Under universal domain, a social betterness order is generated for any pro-
file of performance functions. Under A-indiﬀerence respectance, which for
A = AWelf yields standard Pareto indiﬀerence, two states are socially indiﬀer-
ent whenever they perform equally well on each issue in A. Here, "performing
equally well on each issue in A" means
- making people equally well-oﬀ if A = AWelf ,
- being equally wanted if A = APref ,
- being considered equally good if A = AJudg.
The condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives subtly diﬀers from
the standard condition with this name. The standard IIA condition requires
that the only welfare information used to rank two states be that about these
two states. Our condition requires that the only information about issues in K
(not just about issues in AWelf ) used to rank two states be that about these two
states.
Part (b) of our theorem will use the following conditions.
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Global unanimity respectance. For any profile U ∈ D and any states
x, y ∈ X, if U(x) >> U(y) then x ÂU y.
A-unanimity respectance. For any profile U ∈ D and any states x, y ∈ X,
if UA(x) >> UA(y) then x ÂU y.
A-unanimity respectance states that a state is better than another if it
performs better on each issue in A, regardless of other issues. If A = K this
yields global unanimity respectance. I call the A-unanimity respectance
- welfare-unanimity respectance or weak Pareto principle if A = AWelf ,
- preference-unanimity respectance if A = APref ,
- judgment-unanimity respectance if A = AJudg.
These three conditions require, respectively, that a state be ranked above
another if it Pareto-dominates the other, or is unanimously preferred to the
other, or is unanimously judged better than the other.
While A-unanimity respectance may appear problematic for many aspects
A (see Sen’s (1979) critique of the weak Pareto principle), global unanim-
ity respectance is much less problematic provided that the set of issues K is
suﬃciently comprehensive. For instance, the frequent argument against the
weak Paretianism (i.e. AWelf -unanimity respectance), namely its ignoring of
the source of welfare, does not work against global unanimity respectance if K
contains the issues SoWi, i ∈ N . This is why the additional assumption in part
(b) of the following theorem is mild.
Theorem 1 Consider any aspect A ⊆ K.
(a) If F satisfies universal domain, independence of irrelevant alternatives,
and A-indiﬀerence respectance, F satisfies A-ism.
(b) If also global unanimity respectance holds, A-unanimity respectance holds.
Is part (a) a suitable normative defense of A-ism, and is part (b) one of
A-unanimity respectance? Of course, this will depend on the issues contained
in A. A welfarist would probably accept the argument if A = AWelf . Someone
who objects to welfarism on the grounds that it neglects the source of people’s
welfare might accept the argument if A = AWelf ∪ASoW.
For many aspects A ⊆ K, A-indiﬀerence respectance might be the most
controversial premise in Theorem 1. Indeed, the same reason that may lead one
to doubt A-ism in the first place (namely the insensitivity to non-A information)
may also lead one to doubt A-indiﬀerence respectance.
The proof of part (a) is more involved than that of the standard welfarism
theorem. Instead of presenting a free-standing proof, I will reduce part (a),
by some rather counter-intuitive identifications, to Theorem 2 in Blackorby,
Bossert and Donaldson (2005).
Proof. (a) Suppose F is as specified. To reduce this claim to Blackorby,
Bossert and Donaldson’s (2005) Theorem 2, I identify their set N (of individu-
als) with A, their set S0 (of social non-welfare characteristics) with RK\A, and
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each of their sets S1, ...,Sn (of individual non-welfare characteristics) with the
singleton {0}. Then a profile in their sense can be identified with a triple of
functions Υ = (Γ1,Γ2,Γ3), where Γ1 is a function X → RA, Γ2 is a function
X → RK\A, and Γ3 is a function X → {0}A. Since there is only one function
Γ3 : X → {0}A (as {0}A is a singleton), a profile Υ = (Γ1,Γ2,Γ3) can be further
identified with the pair (Γ1,Γ2), which can in turn be identified with a profile
a profile in our sense U : X → RK by defining
Uk(x) :=
½
Γ1k(x) if k ∈ A
Γ2k(x) if k ∈ K\A, for all x ∈ X.
Under these identifications, our evaluation functionals are identical to theirs, our
conditions of universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives are
equivalent to their equally named conditions, and ourA-indiﬀerence respectance
is equivalent to their Pareto indiﬀerence principle. So, by their Theorem 2, F
is strongly neutral, a condition equivalent to our A-ism.
(b) Assume that global unanimity respectance also holds. To show A-
unanimity respectance, consider any profile U ∈ D and any states x, y ∈ X
with UA(x) >> UA(y). By universal domain, there is a profile U∗ ∈ D
such that UA(x) = U∗A(x), UA(y) = U
∗
A(y), and U
∗
K\A(x) >> U
∗
K\A(y). Then
U∗(x) >> U∗(y), and so x ÂU∗ y by global unanimity respectance. Hence
(*) x ºU∗ y and not y ºU∗ x
Further, applying A-ism (for x = x∗ and y = y∗), x ºU y ⇔ x ºU∗ y, and
so, by (*), x ºU y. Applying A-ism a second time (now for x = x∗ and y = y∗),
we have y ºU x ⇔ y ºU∗ x, and so, again by (*), not y ºU x. Since x ºU y
but not y ºU x, we have y ÂU x, as desired. ¥
A final remark. Any A-ism (AWelf -ism, AWelf ∪ APref -ism, ...) is equivalent
to the existence of a binary relation R on RA such that
x ºU y ⇔ UA(x)RUA(y) for all x, y ∈ X and all U ∈ D. (3)
For instance, in the case of judgmentism (A = AJudg), x ºU y ⇔ UJudg(x)RUJudg(y).
By (3), the task of ranking social states reduces to the task of ranking A-
dimensional vectors. In this sense, F is represented by R.
If F has universal domain, R is unique and it is an ordering (i.e. is reflexive,
transitive and complete). In the case of welfarism (A = AWelf ), R may be called
a social welfare ordering, following Gevers (1979). In the case of preferencism
(A = APref ) or judgmentism (A = AJudg), one might call R a social preference
ordering or a social judgment ordering, respectively.
If R is moreover continuous10, then by Debreu’s representation theorem R
is representable by a continuous function f : RA → R in the sense that, for any
u, v ∈ RA, uRv ⇔ f(u) ≥ f(v). (f may be called a Bergson-Samuelson social
10that is, for each u ∈ RA the sets {v ∈ RA : vRu} and {v ∈ RA : uRv} are topologically
closed in RA
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welfare function if A = AWelf ). For instance, in our examples (1) and (2) we
have
f(u) =
X
k∈A
uk respectively f(u) = min
k∈A
uk, for all u ∈ RA.
F is represented by f in the sense that social betterness maximises f ◦ UA, i.e.
x ºU y ⇔ f(UA(x)) ≥ f(UA(y)) for all x, y ∈ X and all U ∈ D.
For instance, social betterness maximises f ◦ UWelf in the case of welfarism,
f ◦ UPref in the case of preferencism, and f ◦ UJudg in the case of judgmentism.
6 A problem of preferencism: its favouring of
the selfish
I should record a potentially serious objection to preferencism (and the asso-
ciated weak Pareto principle). As is sometimes noted (e.g. Roemer 1995, ch.
1.4), if some individuals i have self-regarding preferences (that reflect their own
welfare, perhaps to the extent that UPrefi = UWelfi), and the other individuals
i have other-regarding preferences (that incorporate the welfare of others, per-
haps to the extent that UPrefi is a function of of the functions UWelfj , j ∈ N\{i}),
then respecting only people’s preferences implies respecting more the welfare of
some ("selfish") people than the welfare of other ("altruistic") people. For in-
stance, if state y ∈ X arises from state x ∈ X by a redistribution that makes
all "altruistic" people poor and all "selfish" people rich, then preferencist rules
(such as the maximisation of sum-total preference
X
i∈N
UPrefi) may well rank
y over x, which appears unfair. Preferencism might appear even more problem-
atic when some persons’ preferences not only ignore the welfare of others, but
are directed against the welfare of others (wanting others to suﬀer) or against
their personal welfare (masochism).
This casts doubts on preferencism, and thus also on allocation mechanisms
of (idealised) market economies, interpreted as implementations of (choice rules
induced by) preferencist evaluation functionals (see Section 5).
7 A problem of welfarism: its paternalism
A paternalism charge is often brought against non-welfarist positions. By con-
trast, I now argue that welfarism is more vulnerable to a paternalism charge
than preferencism or judgmentism. When analysing diﬀerent A-isms (e.g. wel-
farism), I will focus not directly on the A-ism condition but on A-unanimity
respectance, which naturally comes together with A-ism by part (b) of Theorem
1.
Consider states x, y ∈ X, and suppose x welfare-dominates y, i.e. gives
everyone a higher welfare (UWelf(x) >> UWelf(y)). Suppose also that one
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of the two states preference-dominates the other (UPref(x) >> UPref(y) or
UPref(y) >> UPref(x)), and one of the two states judgment-dominates the other
(UJudg(x) >> UJudg(y) or UJudg(y) >> UJudg(x)). Such situations can frequently
be encountered.11 Table 1 contains what might appear to be the non-paternalist
social ranking of x and y, depending on the direction of the various dominations.
which state
welfare-domin.
the other?
which state
preference-domin.
the other?
which state
judgment-domin.
the other?
non-
paternalist
ranking
case 1: x x x x ÂU y
case 2: x y y y ÂU x
case 3: x x y depends
case 4: x y x depends
Table 1: Which social ranking of x and y is non-paternalist (arguably)?
In case 1, x dominates y in all three respects, and so non-paternalism clearly
prescribes the ranking x Â y. In case 2, y is higher than x in everyone’s
preference and judgment, although y gives everyone less welfare. In my view,
non-paternalism requires the ranking y ÂU x, because it would appear pater-
nalist to give people welfare that they neither want nor judge as good. More
generally, one might regard welfarism as paternalist, and APref ∪ AJudg-ism as
non-paternalist.
Cases 3 and 4 are more subtle, as people’s unanimous preference contra-
dicts their unanimous goodness judgment. Which ranking of x and y is non-
paternalist? Presumably, any answer would depend on the interpretation and
role of the social ordering ºU . If we (re-)interpret ºU as representing social
preferences rather than (moral) goodness comparisons12 then non-paternalism
requires these social preferences to follow people’s unanimous preferences, not
judgments. Indeed, the unanimously wanted must be socially wanted (note: I
do not say here "socially good", given the interpretation of ºU). Judgmen-
tism thus appears paternalist and preferencism non-paternalist. But what if
ºU represents a (moral) goodness ordering? At first, one might be tempted to
take judgmentism as non-paternalist, since overruling people’s judgments would
mean imposing external judgments on the group. But a closer look at the ques-
tion reveals that we need further distinctions (explained in Section 8). Possibly,
judgmentism could be viewed as non-paternalist in an indicative aggregation
task (where the profile U is used as evidence for social goodness), whereas pref-
erencism could be viewed as non-paternalist in a constitutive aggregation task
11One such scenario could be that citizens have to either cut a forest (x) or leave it (y),
where all citizens gain from cutting the forest (UWelf (x) >> UWelf (y)), want the forest to be
cut for selfish reasons (UPref (x) >> UPref (y)) but judge cutting the forest as morally bad for
environmental reasons (UJudg(y) >> UJudg(x)).
12Like for an individual, we can think of society as wanting something that is not morally
good, and vice versa.
13
(where the profile U determines/constitutes social goodness).
In summary, welfarism appears to be paternalist, preferencism and judg-
mentism may or may not be considered as paternalist, and APref ∪ AJudg-ism
appears non-paternalist.
Finally, I should note that non-paternalism need not be treated as a holy
grail. One may well defend a (paternalist) overruling of certain unanimous
preferences or judgments. For instance, if the population unanimously prefers
and judges as better a fascist dictatorship as compared to some democracy,
then the social betterness of the democracy might still be defended on the
grounds of performing better on other issues in K\(APref ∪ AJudg) such as the
informedness or moral integrity of individual preferences or judgments, or the
state’s constitution or certain values or rights.
8 When is judgment information (ir)relevant?
Two distinct aggregation tasks
The question which information is (ir)relevant to social betterness, and hence
whether A-ism is justified for any given aspect A ⊆ K, often depends on the
aggregation task under consideration. In this section, I distinguish two such
aggregation tasks, and assess the (ir)relevance of judgment information under
each of them.
Two distinct aggregation tasks. To begin with an analogy, suppose the task
is not to answer the question "Under which circumstances is state x better
than state y?" but "Under what circumstances did it snow last night?". If
this question is understood as asking "What determines whether it snowed?",
the answer is presumably "certain conditions of temperature and humidity last
night". If the question is instead understood as asking "What makes us know
whether it snowed?", the answer is presumably "snow everywhere today". What
is of interest is in the first case the determinants/origins of snowing, and in the
second case the evidence for snowing.
Similarly, one should distinguish the following two aggregation tasks.13
• Constitutive aggregation. Here, the profile U contains what determines
(or: constitutes, makes up, is the reason for or origin of) true social goodness.
So, x ºU y means "x is at least as good as y because the profile is U". Note that
this aggregation task may be purely theoretical, as the determinants U may be
unavailable.
• Indicative aggregation. Here, the profile U contains the informational
or evidential clues used to form social betterness judgments or estimates. So
x ºU y means "x is considered at least as good as y based on the information
that the profile is U". Note that such goodness estimates are based on possibly
insuﬃcient (perhaps even misleading) information U , such as rough surrogates
13It is thanks to Christian List’s advice that I use the terms "constitutive" and "indicative".
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or indicators. So ºU may diﬀer from the "true" social ordering obtained in a
constitutive aggregation task.
Examples. Both aggregation tasks are frequently discussed. For instance,
classical utilitarianism claims that the only determinants of social betterness
are the individual happiness levels; so that, in a constitutive aggregation task,
F should be A-ist with A the set of individual happiness issues. But, as indi-
vidual happiness is hardly accessible, the utilitarian may turn in practice to an
indicative aggregation task, and use profiles U containing information such as
individual judgments on sum-total happiness, or rough indicators of individual
happiness.
The welfarist claim that only welfare information can matter refers to the
constitutive aggregation task. This welfarist claim is perfectly compatible with
allowing judgment information to enter an indicative aggregation task. So judg-
mentism and welfarism are not in a conflict if judgmentism is restricted to
indicative aggregation tasks.
Roberts’ (1995) aggregation of diﬀerent opinions on diﬀerent individuals’
welfare can be interpreted as an indicative aggregation task.
When is judgment information relevant? Clearly, as people’s judgments may
indicate social goodness, judgment information may be relevant in for indicative
aggregation, perhaps even to the point of judgmentism (where only judgment
information is used).
Now consider a constitutive aggregation task. Under standard notions of
social goodness (for instance welfarist ones), individual goodness judgments
are not determinants of social goodness: believing that a state is good does
not make the state good. I should however mention that one could, perhaps,
reject an independent notion of goodness and argue that "social goodness" has
no meaning beyond that of a "summary" of subjective views. In this case,
individual goodness judgments do determine/constitute social goodness, and
the constitutive aggregation task becomes a judgmentist one.
9 An impossibility result onmulti-aspect-based
social goodness
The objections that can be raised against A-ist positions for many aspects
A ⊆ K, such as those discussed above against welfarism and preferencism,
suggest to give up any narrow A-ist position and instead base social goodness
on multiple aspects. One could imagine to combine information on aspects such
as welfare, preference, judgments, source of welfare, fulfilment of rights, and so
on.
I consider such a multi-aspect approach to be important (at least concep-
tually), but I have to address an obstacle that it faces related to the non-
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comparability between suﬃciently diﬀerent aspects. Combined with other con-
ditions, an impossibility theorem will emerge. Like for Arrow’s theorem, the
impossibility can — and should — be overcome, but the escape-route appears
narrower, or so I will argue in Section 10.
Formally, our theorem is closely related (but not identical) to results derived
in diﬀerent contexts by Roberts (1995), Khmelnitskaya and Weymark (2000),
and List (2004), who all study non-comparabilities between certain sets of in-
formation (where each set contains, respectively, a person’s opinions on welfare,
welfare information about similar individuals, and welfare information of a given
type). As a side eﬀect, our theorem will close a gap in List’s (2004) proof.
Suppose that we want to combine, for instance, welfare, preference and
judgment information, by constructing an AWelf ∪ APref ∪ AJudg-ist evaluation
functional. To combine these three aspects attractively, certain comparisons
between these aspects should plausibly be allowed (i.e. be built into the eval-
uation functional F ). But is it meaningful to say, for instance, that person i
has more welfare in x than preference for x? Or that the (moral) goodness gain
from x to y in person’s i’s judgment exceeds person j’s welfare gain from x to
y? Presumably, negative answers apply both times.
Or, suppose that, addressing Sen’s concerns about sources of welfare, we
want to combine welfare and source-of-welfare information through an AWelf ∪
ASoW-ist evaluation functional. It appears meaningless to call some welfare
higher than the moral acceptability of some source of welfare.
To formalise inter-aspect comparisons, letA be a partition of the set of issues
K into (mutually exclusive and exhaustive) aspects A ⊆ K. Interpretationally,
any two distinct aspects A,A∗ ∈ A should be of diﬀerent nature, whereas two
issues within the same aspect A ∈ A may have similar nature. For instance,
if K = {Welfi,Prefi, Judgi : i ∈ N} then, plausibly, A = {AWelf , APref , AJudg};
and if K = {Welfi, SoWi : i ∈ N} then, plausibly, A = {AWelf , ASoW}. For
other concrete examples, consider the situations (i)-(iv) in Section 2.
(i) (standard welfare economics, K = N) Following Khmelnitskaya (1999)
and Khmelnitskaya and Weymark (2000), we may letA consist of subgroups of
"similar" persons.
(ii) (Roberts’ 1995 model of opinions on welfare,K = {(i, d) : i ∈ N, d ∈ D})
We may put A = {{(i, d) : i ∈ N} : d ∈ D}, where an aspect {(i, d) : i ∈ N}
represents the opinions of person d.
(iii) (List’s 2004 model of multi-dimensional welfare, K as in (ii)) We may
define A as in (ii); an aspect {(i, d) : i ∈ N} now represents all welfare infor-
mation of one type d (e.g. all information on individual life expectancies).
(iv) (K = {S,H,E}, with issues "social stability" (S), "health" (H), and
"equality" (E)) We may put A = {{S}, {H}, {E}} (each aspect is a singleton).
The exclusion of inter-aspect comparisons has been defended for the cases
(i)-(iii) by the respective authors; the exclusion appears similarly (or even more)
defensible for the cases (iv), A = {AWelf , APref , AJudg}, and A = {AWelf , ASoW},
in each of which A contains aspects of very diﬀerent nature.
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To exclude inter-aspect comparisons, I use the standard route of imposing
invariance conditions. Suppose that an equivalence relation ≡ on the set of
profiles U : X → RK is given, representing informational equivalence of profiles.
Two profiles U,U∗ with U ≡ U∗ contain precisely the same information. It then
becomes justified to require that ºU=ºU∗ for all U,U∗ ∈ D with U ≡ U∗, i.e.
that the function F is constant on each equivalence class.
We say that ≡ satisfies inter-aspect non-comparability (w.r.t. partition A)
if ≡ is a product of equivalence relations in an obvious sense: there exists
to each aspect A ∈ A an equivalence relation ≡A on the set of A-subprofiles
V : X → RA (representing informational equivalence of A-subprofiles) such
that, for all profiles U,U∗ : X → RK ,
U ≡ U∗ ⇔ [UA ≡A U∗A for all aspects A ∈ A].
In words, two profiles are informationally equivalent just in case, for each aspect
A ∈ A, the twoA-subprofiles are informationally equivalent. Any≡-equivalence
class is then the Cartesian product of the ≡A-equivalence classes, A ∈ A; that
is, [U ]≡ = ×A∈A[UA]≡A for each profile U : X → RK .14
For any aspect A ∈ A, the equivalence relation ≡A represents particular
assumptions on the measurability of issues in A and their (intra-aspect) com-
parability. So (≡A)A∈A is a family of (intra-aspect) informational assumptions,
i.e. a family of measurability and comparability assumptions, one for each
aspect A ∈ A. To construct an informational assumption ≡ satisfying inter-
aspect non-comparability, it is suﬃcient to formulate a family of intra-aspect
comparability and measurability assumptions (≡A)A∈A, and to define ≡ as the
product of these relations. Some aspects A ∈ A (e.g. the preference aspect
APref ) might be ordinally measurable and fully comparable15, other aspects
(e.g. welfare AWelf and judgment AJudg) might be cardinally measurable and
unit-comparable, and even other aspects (e.g. sources of welfare ASoW) might
be cardinally measurable and fully comparable.
F respects this informational restriction if it obeys the following condition.
Inter-aspect non-comparable (≡A)A∈A-information. For any profiles
U,U∗ ∈ D, we have ºU=ºU∗ if, for each aspect A ∈ A, UA ≡A U∗A.
Taking the case of standard welfare economics (K = N) with A = {{i} : i ∈
N}, the condition becomes one of inter-personal non-comparability, examples
of which are: ordinal non-comparability (here each aspect, i.e. personal welfare,
14If ≡ satisfies inter-aspect non-comparability, the family (≡A)A∈A whose product ≡ is
is unique and can be retrieved from ≡ as follows: for any A ∈ A any any A-subprofiles
V, V ∗ : X → RA, define V ≡A V ∗ :⇔ [U ≡ U∗ for some profiles U,U∗ : X → RK with
U |A = V and U∗|A = V ∗].
15If A is ordinally measurable fully comparable, then, for any A-subprofile V : X → RA
and any strictly increasing transformation φ : R → R, V is informationally equivalent to
the transformed subprofile (φ ◦ Vk)k∈A, i.e. V ≡A (φ ◦ Vk)k∈A. So V ∼A (Vk + 1)k∈A ∼A
(exp ◦Vk)k∈A ∼A...
17
is ordinally measurable), and cardinal non-comparability (here each aspect, i.e.
personal welfare, is cardinally measurable).16
In the impossibility result, I assume that each aspect A ∈ A is cardinally
measurable and fully (intra-aspect) comparable. Given this form of the equiv-
alence relations ≡A, A ∈ A, the above condition becomes as follows. A trans-
formation φ : R→ R is called increasing aﬃne if there are fixed numbers
a ∈ R and b > 0 such that g(x) = ax + b for all x ∈ R. Also, for any profile
U = (Uk)k∈K and any family φ = (φk)k∈K of transformations φk : R→ R, I
write φ ◦ U for the ("transformed") profile (φk ◦ Uk)k∈K .
Inter-aspect non-comparable cardinal information (w.r.t. A). For
any profiles U,U∗ ∈ D, we have ºU=ºU∗ if U∗ = φ ◦ U for some family φ =
(φk)k∈K of increasing aﬃne transformations such that φk = φl for any issues k, l
from the same aspect A ∈ A.
This requires the social betterness ordering ºU to remain unchanged when-
ever each performance function in the profile U is subjected to some (possibly
aspect-dependent) increasing aﬃne transformation. For instance, if AJudg ∈ A,
the condition requires the ordering ºU to remain unchanged if in U we replace
each individual judgment function UJudgi by the new function 10 + 5UJudgi.
Further, the result will use the following continuity notion.
Continuity. For every profile U ∈ D and every states x, y ∈ X with
x ÂU y, we have x ºU y for at least one profile U ∈ D such that U(x) ≤ U(x)
and U(y) ≥ U(y), where at least one of these vector inequalities is strict in each
component.
Informally, a social preference (x ÂU y) shouldn’t be reversed for at least one
modification of the profile that reduces the performance x and increases that of
y. The condition is weak because suﬃciently small changes of the profile should
not reverse strict preferences; note that U can indeed be chosen arbitrarily
close to U . The condition is weaker than other conditions with a perhaps more
straightforward continuity interpretation.17
Finally, I call an aspect A ⊆ K dictatorial if there exists a function f :
RA → R (an index of the aspect A, or A-index), increasing with an increase in
16For an excellent overview of diﬀerent notions of informational equivalence, see Bossert
and Weymark (2004).
17An (at least under universal domain) stronger condition is that, for every profile U ∈ D
and every states x, y ∈ X with x ÂU y, there is an  > 0 such that x ºU y for all profiles
U ∈ D in the -environment of U (i.e., supz∈X,k∈K |Uk(z)−Uk(z)| < ). If F is representable
by an ordering R on RK (i.e., for any x, y ∈ X and U ∈ D, x ºU y ⇔ U(x)RU(y)), our
condition is weaker than the continuity of R, a condition on F that was first used by Maskin
(1978) and implies that R is representable by a continuous function g : RK → R by Debreu’s
representation theorem.
18
each argument,18 such that
f(UA(x)) > f(UA(y))⇒ x ÂU y, for all x, y ∈ X and U ∈ D, (4)
if (4) even holds with "⇔" instead of "⇒", I call A strongly dictatorial.19
A dictatorial aspect is lexically prior in the sense that (issues from) other
aspects come into play only when comparing two states that are ranked equally
by the A-index. If an aspect is even strongly dictatorial, other information is
entirely irrelevant: it doesn’t even come into play when two states are ranked
equally by the A-index, since such states will be automatically indiﬀerent.
Theorem 2 Let F satisfy universal domain, independence of irrelevant alter-
natives, global unanimity respectance, and inter-aspect non-comparable cardinal
information (with respect to some partition A of K into aspects). Then:
(a) Some aspect A ∈ A is dictatorial, which implies A-unanimity respectance.
(b) If F is also continuous, A is strongly dictatorial, which implies A-ism.
As mentioned, Theorem 2 is closely related to previous results, translated
into our model of arbitrary issues. It actually implies List’s (2004) two central
theorems (theorems 2 and 3), for which he did not provide a full proof.20
Note also that part (a) implies (Sen’s 1970 cardinal strengthening of) Ar-
row’s Theorem by taking K = N and A = {{i} : i ∈ N}.
As a self-contained proof would be extensive, I will essentially reduce part
(a) to Theorem 2 in Khmelnitskaya and Weymark (2000) via Roberts’ (1980)
weak welfarism theorem in Hammond’s (1996) corrected version.
Proof. Let F satisfy the specified conditions. By identifying issues with
individuals, these conditions become equivalent to the analogous standard con-
ditions. Notationally, the restriction of a vector u ∈ RK to an aspect A ⊆ K is
denoted uA (i.e. uA := (uk)k∈A).
Further, for any profile U : X → RK , the binary relation ÂÂU on X (of
strong strict preference) is defined as follows (see Roberts 1980): for any states
x, y ∈ X, x ÂÂU y holds if and only if x ÂU y for some profile U ∈ D with
U(x) << U(x), U(y) >> U(y), and U(z) = U(z) ∀z ∈ X\{x, y}.
(We say strong strict preference since x is preferred to y even after reducing
each issue’s performance on x and raising each issue’s performance on y.)
18i.e., for every u, v ∈ RA, if u >> v then f(u) > f(v)
19In case K = N , an individual i ∈ N is (strongly) dictatorial in the standard sense of
welfare economics if and only if the singleton aspect {i} is (strongly) dictatorial in our sense.
20List reduces his results to a (correct) theorem that he attributes to Roberts (1995); in
fact, Roberts only proves a related theorem (with stronger notions of Pareto and dictatorship).
To derive List’s results from Theorem 2, note that his dominating welfare dimensions (and
dictatorial individuals) are examples of dictatorial aspects (where List uses the term "strictly
increasing" for "increasing with an increase in each argument").
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(a) The proof of this part proceeds in four steps.
1. I first show that strong strict preference is invariant under the same
transformations as the social ordering ºU :
(*) For any profiles U,U∗ : X → RK , we have ÂÂU=ÂÂU∗if U∗ = φ ◦U for
some family φ = (φk)k∈K of increasing aﬃne transformations such that φk = φl
for any issues k, l from the same aspect A ∈ A.
Let U,U∗, φ be as specified. Consider any states x, y ∈ X. I only show
that x ÂÂU y ⇒ x ÂÂU∗ y, as the converse implication holds analogously. So
assume y ÂÂU y. Hence x ÂU y for some profile U ∈ D such that
U(x) << U(x), U(y) >> U(y), and U(z) = U(z) ∀z ∈ X\{x, y}. (5)
I define the profiles U
∗
: X → RK as the cardinal transformations of U∗, i.e.
U
∗
:= φ◦U . By universal domain, U∗ ∈ D, and so ºU=ºU∗ by the assumption
of inter-aspect non-comparable cardinal information. So ÂU=ÂU∗. Hence, as
x ÂU y, we have x ÂU∗ y. Further, since any (in)equality is preserved if each
side is subjected to the same strictly increasing transformation, (5) implies that
U
∗
(x) << U∗(x), U
∗
(y) >> U∗(y), and U
∗
(z) = U∗(z) ∀z ∈ X\{x, y}.
This together with x ÂU∗ y entails that x ÂÂU∗ y, as desired.
2. To apply Roberts’ (1980) weak welfarism theorem in Hammond’s (1996)
corrected form, we first need to check that Hammond’s pairwise continuity con-
dition holds, i.e. that
(PC) for each  ∈ RK with  >> 0 there exists an 0 ∈ RK with 0 >> 0
such that, for any U ∈ D and x, y ∈ X with x ÂU y, we have x ÂU∗ y for some
U∗ ∈ D with U∗(x) << U(x)− ∗ and U∗(y) >> U(y)− .
Suppose  ∈ RK with  >> 0. Since K is finite, there is a smallest compo-
nent of , say δ ∈ R. Define 0 ∈ RK by 0k = δ/4 for each k ∈ K. Obviously,
0 >> 0. Consider any U ∈ D and x, y ∈ X with x ÂU y. Define a ∈ RK
by ak = δ/2 for all k ∈ K. By universal domain, the profile U∗ defined by
U∗(z) = U(z)−a for all z ∈ X belongs to D. By our assumption of inter-aspect
non-comparable cardinal information, ÂU∗=ÂU , whence x ÂU∗ y. Finally, by
0 << a we have U∗(x) << U(x)−∗, and by a <<  we have U∗(y) >> U(y)−,
proving (PC).
As F satisfies (PC), as well as universal domain, independence of irrelevant
alternatives and global unanimity respectance, the weak welfarism theorem (see
Roberts 1980 and Hammond 1996) applies. Its conclusion can be states as
follows: there exists a continuous function W : RK → R, increasing with an
increase in each argument, such that
W (U(x)) > W (U(y))⇔ x ÂÂU y, for all x, y ∈ X and U ∈ D. (6)
In particular, as x ÂÂU y ⇒ x ÂU y (see Lemma 1 in Roberts 1980),
W (U(x)) > W (U(y))⇒ x ÂU y, for all x, y ∈ X and U ∈ D. (7)
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3. If A is the singleton {K}, we are finished since K is dictatorial by (7).
Now suppose |A| ≥ 2.21 I will apply Theorem 2 in Khmelnitskaya andWeymark
(2000) to the ordering induced by W , i.e. to the ordering R on RK given by
uRv ⇔W (u) ≥W (v), for all u, v ∈ RK . (8)
To do so, I first show that R satisfies the following condition (of invariance
under cardinal aspect-dependent transformations):
(**) for all u, u∗, v, v∗ ∈ RK , we have uRv ⇔ u∗Rv∗ if u∗ = φ(u) and
v∗ = φ(v) for some family φ = (φk)k∈K of increasing aﬃne transformations such
that φk = φl for any issues k, l from the same aspect A ∈ A.
Let u, u∗, v, v∗, φ be as specified. I only show that u∗Rv∗ ⇒ uRv, since the
opposite implication is analogous. Suppose for a contradiction that not uRv. By
|X| ≥ 3 there exist distinct states x, y ∈ X. By universal domain, D contains
a profile U : X → RK with U(x) = u and U(y) = v. Since not uRv, we have
not U(x)RU(y), hence by (8) W (U(y)) > W (U(x)), and so by (6) y ÂÂU x.
So, by (*), y ÂÂU∗ x, where U∗ is the transformed profile φ ◦ U . Again by
(6), W (U∗(y)) > W (U∗(x)), whence by (8) we have not U∗(x)RU∗(y), i.e. not
u∗Rv∗, as desired.
Since R satisfies (**), is continuous (as W is continuous), and is weakly
Paretian (asW is increasing with an increase in each argument), Khmelnitskaya
and Weymark’s Theorem 2 applies to R, whence there exists and aspect A ∈ A
and a continuous and weakly Paretian ordering RA on RA such that
uRv ⇔ uARAvA, for all u, v ∈ RK . (9)
By the continuity of RA, Debreu’s representation theorem implies the existence
of a continuous function f : RA → R such that
uRAv ⇔ f(u) ≥ f(v), for all u, v ∈ RA. (10)
4. The equivalences (8), (9) and (10) jointly imply that
W (u) ≥W (v)⇔ f(uA) ≥ f(vA), for all u, v ∈ RK.
This and (7) together imply that
f(UA(x)) > f(UA(y))⇒ x ÂU y, for all x, y ∈ X and U ∈ D.
So the aspect A is dictatorial, as desired.
(b) The proof of this part proceeds in two steps.
1. First I show that
u ≥ v ⇒ f(u) ≥ f(v), for all u, v ∈ RA.
21Khmelnitskaya and Weymark restrict their theorem to the case of a non-singleton parti-
tion. In fact, their result would also hold without this restriction.
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Let u, v ∈ RA satisfy u ≥ v, and suppose for a contradiction that f(u) < f(v).
As f is continuous, there is a neighbourhood B of u such that f(u0) < f(v) for
all u0 ∈ B. As B is a neighbourhood of u, there exists a u0 ∈ B with u0 >> u.
We have f(u0) < f(v), but by u0 >> v we also have f(u0) > f(v) as f is
increasing with an increase in each argument, a contradiction.
2. Now suppose F also satisfies continuity, and let me show thatA is strongly
dictatorial. As A is dictatorial by part (a), we only need to prove that
f(UA(x)) = f(UA(y))⇒ x ∼U y, for all x, y ∈ X and U ∈ D.
Suppose for a contradiction that x, y ∈ X and U ∈ D satisfy f(UA(x)) =
f(UA(y)) but not x ∼U y, say x ÂU y. Then, as F is continuous, there exists a
profile U ∈ D such that x ºU y and
U(x) ≤ U(x), U(y) ≥ U(y), with at least one of these vector
inequalities strict in each component.
Taking subprofiles, it follows that
UA(x) ≤ UA(x), UA(y) ≥ UA(y),
with at least one of these vector
inequalities strict in each component.
Hence, by 1. and as f is increasing with an increase in each argument,
f(UA(x)) ≤ f(UA(x)), f(UA(y)) ≥ f(UA(y)),
with at least one of these
inequalities strict.
As by assumption f(UA(x)) = f(UA(y)), it follows that f(UA(x)) < f(UA(y)).
So, by part (a), y ÂU x. This contradicts x ÂU y. ¥
As an application, we consider the example where welfare, preference and
judgment are the only aspects.
Corollary 1 SupposeK = {Welfi,Prefi, Judgi : i ∈ N} andA = {AWelf , APref , AJudg}.
If F is as in Theorem 1, one of the following holds:
(i) AWelf is dictatorial, which implies the weak Pareto principle; if F is also
continuous, AWelf is strongly dictatorial, which implies welfarism.
(ii) APref is dictatorial, which implies preference-unanimity respectance; if
F is also continuous, APref is dictatorial, which implies preferencism.
(iii) AJudg is dictatorial, which implies judgment-unanimity respectance; if
F is also continuous, AJudg is dictatorial, which implies judgmentism.
So, under the assumptions of Corollary 1, no trade-oﬀs between welfares,
preferences and judgments are possible. Essentially, one will have to opt either
for welfarism, or for preferencism, or for judgmentism, instead of the desired
"compromise".
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10 Theorem 1 vs. Arrow’s Theorem: which
conditions are relaxable?
Faced with Theorem 2, what conditions can (should) be relaxed to achieve
possibility? Note that the conditions in part (a) of Theorem 2 can be compared
with the conditions of (Sen’s 1970 cardinal version of) Arrow’s Theorem.22 As
summarised in Table 2, let me try to assess the potential for relaxing diﬀerent
conditions, both in Theorem 2 and in Arrow’s Theorem (where I neglect the
domain and co-domain conditions23).
Pareto/
global unanimity
principle
non-inter-
person/aspect
comparability
cardinal
measurability
IIA
Arrow’s
Theorem
not compelling
if non-welfare
info. relevant
not compelling
if comparisons
feasible
not compelling
if finer or diﬀerent
scales feasible
compelling
in constitutive
aggreg. task
Theorem 2
compelling
if K contains
all relevant issues
compelling
as comparisons
meaningless
not compelling
if finer or diﬀerent
scales feasible
compelling
in constitutive
aggreg. task
Table 2: Which conditions of Arrow’s Theorem and Theorem 2 are compelling
(arguably)?
• While Arrow’s weak Pareto principle might be rejected if non-welfare in-
formation is deemed relevant, global unanimity respectance is harder to reject
once enough issues (possibly non-welfare related ones) are included in K.
• While Arrow’s exclusion of interpersonal welfare comparisons may be re-
jected when such comparisons are feasible (such as when an objectively measur-
able notion of welfare is used), inter-aspect performance comparisons are hardly
imaginable and arguably meaningless (provided the aspects in A are genuinely
diﬀerent, such as when A = {AWelf , APref , AJudg}).
• In both theorems, an escape might be sought in dropping the exclusion of
non-cardinal information. Possibilities emerge once welfare respectively perfor-
mance can be measured on a scale finer than cardinality (e.g. a ratio scale or
a translation scale), or on an entirely diﬀerent scale (e.g. List’s 2001 zero-line
measurability24).
22Sen’s version of Arrow’s Theorem states that every social welfare functional satisfy-
ing universal domain, independence of irrelevant alternatives, cardinal inter-personally non-
comparable information, and the weak Pareto principle is dictatorial. These conditions
are equivalent to those of part (a) of Theorem 2 in the special case of K = N and
A = {{i} : i ∈ N}.
23One might advocate domain restrictions and/or an the incompleteness of social orderings
as other, possibly attractive, escape-routes to both impossibility results.
24Under zero-line measurability, utility/performance is measurable up to transformations
φ : R → R that are increasing and satisfy φ(0) = 0. Although zero-line measurability
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• In both theorems, the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) appears plausible at least when dealing with an aggregation task of the
constitutive type (see Section 8). Indeed, to compare two given states x and
y, any information that determines/constitutes the social goodness of other
states z ∈ X\{x, y} appears irrelevant. However, in an aggregation task of the
indicative type, information about other states z ∈ X\{x, y} may be relevant
to ranking x and y, as it may be an indication for the relative goodness of x and
y. (This is how one may defend the Borda count in the context of indicative
aggregation.)
If these arguments are correct, the most promising escape route from the
impossibility of Theorem 1 (aside from relaxing domain or co-domain condi-
tions; see footnote 23) is to drop the cardinality restriction. This amounts
to seeking for diﬀerent measurement scales while retaining inter-aspect non-
comparability. As mentioned above, the new measurement scale may be finer
than or simply unrelated to cardinality. Formally, suppose we have determined
for each aspect A ∈ A an informational assumption ≡A (see Section 9) whose
measurability restriction is weaker than cardinality (e.g. translation-scale mea-
surability) or unrelated to it (e.g. zero-line measurability). Given the family
(≡A)A∈A of aspect-specific informational assumptions, the informational con-
dition of Theorem 2 can be replaced by that of inter-aspect non-comparable
(≡A)A∈A-information (see Section 9).
As an example of how this may allow diﬀerent aspects to be combined and
weighed against each other, suppose each aspect A ∈ A is translation-scale
measurable, i.e., for any V, V ∗ ∈ RA, we have V ≡A V ∗ if and only if there
exists aA ∈ R such that V ∗k = aA + Vk for each issue k ∈ A. Then any
evaluation functional of the generalised utilitarian type, given by
x ºU y ⇔
X
k∈K
wkUk(x) ≥
X
k∈K
wkUk(y), for any x, y ∈ X,U ∈ D,
satisfies inter-aspect non-comparable (≡A)A∈A-information, where wk ≥ 0 rep-
resents the weight given to issue k ∈ K. The other conditions of Theorem 2
also hold if the domain is chosen universal and at least one issue k ∈ K has
positive weight wk; no aspect A ∈ A is dictatorial if the issues with positive
weight do not all belong to the same aspect in A.
Finally, a note of clarification is needed. The goal of enabling inter-aspect
trade-oﬀs while retaining the formal condition of inter-aspect non-comparability
might at first sight appear self-contradictory. How can one possibly weigh non-
comparable aspects against each other? The answer is that "non-comparability"
refers to a descriptive non-comparability, while "weighing" is a valuational
seems only slightly stronger than ordinal measurability, List (2001) shows the impossibility of
Arrow’s Theorem disappears once zero-line measurability is introduced (without introducing
any comparability).
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(hence normative) exercise. While it appears meaningless to call person i’s
welfare "higher" than her preference, it may be meaningful to value her welfare
more than her preference. And while it may be meaningless to call the gain of
(moral) goodness from x to y in person’s i’s judgment "higher" than j’s welfare
gain from x to y, we could again value the former gain more than the latter.
However, a prerequisite for valuing some welfare level more than some prefer-
ence level is that welfare levels and preference levels are significant; similarly,
to weigh a gain in judged-goodnes against a welfare gain the two gains must
be significant. It is to ensure such significance that particular forms of aspect-
measurability are required. This is precisely why forms of aspect-measurability
can enable valuational comparisons between aspects while retaining descriptive
non-comparability.
11 Conclusion
In response to arguments that non-welfare information, or more detailed welfare
information, may matter to the goodness of social states, I have proposed to
analyse social goodness by explicitly including all issues deemed relevant into
the model. Potentially relevant issues are, for each person i, i’s welfare (Welfi),
i’s preference (Prefi), i’s judgment (Judgi), the source of i’s welfare (SoWi), the
respectance of i’s individual rights, etc. Of course, each of these issues could
be split, e.g. Welfi could be split into diﬀerent welfare types (pleasure, life
expectance, ...). Even other issues may be non-person-specific, such as income
equality or preservation of nature. Given any set K of issues, a profile is a
family (Uk)k∈K of performance functions Uk : X → R, measuring how well
states perform on issues: UWelfi(x) measures i’s welfare in x, UPrefi(x) measures
i’s preference for x, etc.
There is an obvious formal similarity between deriving the goodness of social
states as a function of the performance on issues (as done here) and deriving
it as a function of individual welfare (as done in standard welfare economics).
Indeed, by identifying issues with individuals and performance functions with
individual welfare functions, many well-known and powerful results of welfare
economics can be reinterpreted as results about aggregating performance func-
tions. This yields, for instance, characterisations of evaluation functionals such
as maximising sum-total performance or maximising minimal performance.
After substituting individual welfare functions by performance functions,
standard conditions on aggregation rules receive diﬀerent meanings and may
well become or cease to be desirable. For instance, the weak Pareto principle
translates into a global unanimity principle that appears less objectionable (if
K contains enough issues, such as the individual sources of welfare, which are
neglected by weak Paretianism). By contrast, the plausible anonymity condi-
tion of "treating everyone equally" translates into a problematic condition of
"treating all issues equally"; and even weak forms of inter-individual welfare
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comparisons may translate into problematic forms of inter-issue performance
comparisons.
For any aspect, i.e. set of issues A ⊆ K, it can be asked whether this aspect
is exclusively relevant for social goodness: whether the evaluation functional
should be A-ist (as defined in Section 5). Examples are welfarism, preferencism
and judgmentism, where social goodness is fully given by, respectively, welfare
information, preference information, and judgment information. Other exam-
ples are AWelf ∪ASoW-ism and AWelf ∪APref -ism. Similarly to the standard wel-
farism theorem, A-ism may be derived from the conditions of universal domain,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and A-indiﬀerence respectance; adding
the unproblematic global unanimity principle further yields the A-unanimity
principle (Theorem 1).
The question of which information is (ir)relevant to social goodness is diﬃ-
cult and partly philosophical. Presumably, answers would depend on the type
of aggregation task considered. It may help to distinguish between indica-
tive aggregation tasks, where the profile provides merely evidence on social
goodness, and constitutive aggregation tasks, where the profile is what deter-
mines/constitutes social goodness. For instance, the welfarist claim that only
welfare information can matter refers to constitutive aggregation, and is per-
fectly compatible with using judgment information in an indicative aggregation
task. So welfarism for constitutive aggregation is compatible with judgmentism
for indicative aggregation. Judgment information, whose importance for many
indicative aggregation tasks is incontestable, may be viewed as irrelevant for
constitutive aggregation because, under many but not all notions of goodness,
individual judgments are not determinants of (but merely evidence for) social
goodness.
If one takes a "purist" position by letting social goodness depend on infor-
mation of a single type (aspect), obvious candidates are welfarism, preferencism
and judgmentism. I have argued that welfarism faces a paternalism charge (by
giving people welfare regardless of whether they want it or judge it as morally
good), and that preferencism faces the charge of potentially favouring selfish
people (whose welfare is represented in their preference) over altruistic peo-
ple (whose welfare might be underrepresented). One need not consider these
objections as defeating; but if one does, one might well opt for judgmentism.
By contrast, a "non-purist" position (more in line with the present model)
would be to combine information of diﬀerent types (aspects), e.g. informa-
tion on welfare and welfare sources, or information on welfare, preferences and
judgments. While this appears attractive, it faces an impossibility result (see
Theorem 2): if information is cardinal and inter-aspect non-comparable, and
the conditions of universal domain, global unanimity respectance and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives hold, then some aspect (information type) is
dictatorial, i.e. some index for that aspect determines the ranking between all
states unless where the index results in a tie (see Section 9). For instance, if
welfare and source-of-welfare are the only two aspects, one of them must be
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dictatorial. Yet a "good" combination of aspects would have allowed trade-oﬀs
between aspects.
Is this the death of the multi-aspect approach? No, but there appear to be
fewer escape-routes than from Arrow’s Theorem: global unanimity respectance
appears more fundamental than weak Paretianism, and comparisons across as-
pects appear conceptually more problematic than across individuals. I have
argued that this points towards having to drop the cardinality restriction, and
seeking for forms of measurability that are finer than cardinality, e.g. ratio-
scale, translation-scale or even full measurability, or completely diﬀerent to
cardinality, e.g. List’s (2001) zero-line measurability. Such alternative mea-
surement scales could open up possibilities of combining information from dif-
ferent aspects. So Theorem 2 can also be read as telling us that, in order to
enable attractive multi-aspect aggregation, measuring performance cardinally
does not suﬃce — a finding that might appear interesting to the theoretician
and disturbing to the practitioner.
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